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Abstract 
I t  is  shown that  some economic phenomena cannot  be studied through models 
based on the classic  scheme of the agent  with perfect  rat ional i ty.  They require the 
construct ion of models  where the agents’ bounded cognit ive processes are 
explici t ly represented.  This goal  can be reached through computat ional  models 
based on a  genetic  algori thms and neural  networks.  The strength of this  approach 
is  shown through an ol igopolis t ic  model  in which art i ficial  agents  with learning 
capaci ty,  autonomously develop their  pr ice-set t ing procedures.  The resul ts  of the 
s imulat ions show that  decision makers,  endowed with l imited cognit ive resources,  
may evolve toward simple and robust  decision rules  using less  information in more 
complex environments.  Moreover  they show how market-pr ice can be strongly 
influenced by agents’ cognit ive processes.  
 
Introduction and work outline 
 
“Economic analysis  has largely avoided quest ions about  the way 
in which economic agents make choices when confronted by a  
perpetual ly novel  and evolving world.  As a  resul t ,  there are  outstanding 
quest ions of great  interest  to  economics in areas ranging from 
technological  innovation to  strategic  learning in games.  This is  so ,  
despi te  the importance of the quest ions,  because standard tools and 
formal  models  are i l l - tuned for  answering such quest ions.  However,  
recent  advances in computer-based model ing techniques,  and in the 
subdiscipl ine of ar t i ficial  intel l igence cal led machine learning,  offer  
new possibi l i t ies .”  
Holland J .  H. ,  Mil ler  J .  H.  (1991).  
 
This work addresses the economic agents modeling issue. The 
main idea of the work is clearly expressed by Holland’s quotation. Its 
development can be summarized through the following points, which 
correspond to the sections of the work. 
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1. Rationality theory models ignore the cognitive processes 
underlying agents’ behavior. They try to predict agents’ behavior on 
the basis of information about their goals and the environment where 
they act. In some cases the environment is simple compared to the 
agents’ cognitive abilities, in other cases in the environment there are 
mechanisms which select the most efficient agents. In these cases the 
agents’ behavior converges to the behavior predicted by the rational 
models. 
2. In other cases the environment is complex and changeable and 
there are not selective mechanisms in it .  In these cases the agents’ real 
behavior can diverge considerably from that predicted by the rational 
models. The bounded rationality theory claims that in these 
circumstances models have to incorporate a suitable representation of 
economic agents’ cognitive processes important for the studied 
phenomenon, to yield accurate predictions and descriptions. 
Regarding the nature of agents’ cognitive processes, the bounded 
rationality theory claims that real economic agents often do not behave 
rationally. Namely they do not use maximization procedures and often 
they are not logical and coherent in their decisions and actions. 
Economic agents make decisions and behave on the basis of some 
mechanisms that psychology, sociology, artificial intelligence and 
some economic research are trying to highlight. For example this 
research shows that agents try to reach satisfying levels of their goals 
rather than the highest levels, focus on particular information, base 
their action on preconceived and semiautomatic procedures (routines), 
have implicit knowledge, etc. 
3. Recent artificial intelligence (AI) research lines, called 
connectionism and machine learning, have developed new tools like 
neural networks and genetic algorithms. They are based on principles 
which are very similar to the ones of bounded rationality theory. These 
tools are very suitable to represent agents’ cognitive processes in 
dynamic economic models implemented by computer simulations. For 
these reasons they make it possible to study the shadow zones of the 
economic theory that Holland pointed out. 
4. In order to show the utility and flexibility of simulation models 
which use connectionist and machine learning methods, we have built a 
computer program to simulate an oligopolistic market where some 
artificial agents interact. Before showing the simulation results, we 
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will review existing oligopolistic models to compare them with the 
kind of models which we propose in this work. 
5. The oligopolistic markets which we simulated are a repeated 
Bertrand game with slowly adjusting market shares. The artificial 
agents have at their disposal information about environment and 
adversaries’ actions. On the basis of this information they fix a selling 
price of the only good that they produce, in order to increase their 
profits. With the passing of time the market shares of each agent 
change depending on the ratio between the market price and the set 
price. The artificial agents are made up by neural networks which have 
a learning ability (of effective actions) implemented by genetic 
algorithms.  
6. The hypotheses which we tried to verify through the simulation 
model were some assertions of the bounded rationality theory. 
The most important result we obtained shows that in simple 
environments the agents (with bounded rationality) develop a behavior 
which is sophisticated and reactive to adversaries actions, while in 
complex environment they focus their attention on only a few variables 
(direct costs) and develop action procedures which are simple and 
robust like the mark-up procedure. 
Another result shows that the speed with which the consumers 
shift the demand toward sellers with the lowest prices, and the 
farsightedness of the producer/sellers, effect the long run market price. 
This fact shows that the behavior of an economic system 
composed of several agents can strongly depend on the features of the 
agents’ cognitive processes. In these cases the system’s behavior 
cannot be studied and predicted without considering them. 
 
1. Rationality theory 
 
A model is an abstract scheme which can be used to interpret and 
predict a particular real phenomenon. Microeconomic models try to 
interpret and predict a single economic agent’s behavior (consumer, 
enterprise, institution) or the evolution of multiple-agent systems. 
This behavior is based on several cognitive processes which are 
very heterogeneous and sophisticated, as some research of economic 
theory (Simon, 1957) and cognitive psychology have shown. In the case 
of simple agents (one person) cognitive processes are processes like 
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perception, memorization, information processing, learning, etc. In the 
case of compound agents (organizations) they are processes of 
interpersonal communication, reciprocal influence, organizational 
learning, etc. 
Rationality theory is the most-used approach to represent 
economic agents. In the simplest version it states that agents have 
perfect information about problems to solve, have unlimited cognitive 
capabilities to process it and are logical and coherent. In the most 
refined and widespread version it acknowledges that agents’ behaviors 
results from not fully rational cognitive processes, but in spite of this 
it  suggests to make models “as if” agents were. If this assumption does 
not capture the essential features of the represented phenomenon, then 
the model built on the basis of it cannot yield correct forecasts and can 
be abandoned a posteriori .  The “as if” assumption is often backed up 
in a direct way by saying that in the environment there are mechanisms 
(like the market) that select efficient agents (for instance enterprises). 
In this way agents, even not being intrinsically rational, end by getting 
a rational behavior driven from outside. This approach leads to model 
economic agents in a way that we examine now. 
The perfect information hypothesis implies that every agents’ 
behavior is seen as decision making issues : cognitive processes like 
problem solving, learning, etc., are ignored since they are used to 
gather information. Moreover agents have perfect information about 
their own needs and desires, therefore their goals can be summarized 
by a utility function which expresses the global satisfaction level 
achieved by pursuing specific goals. Also the limits that the 
environment imposes on action are well known by the agents. 
The result of this representation (Hodgson, 1988) is that in 
rational models, agents’ action is described and predicted as the result 
of the maximization of a utility function subordinated to environmental 
constraints (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). For this reason 
mathematical maximization under constraints has become the main tool 
used to build these models. 
In conclusion, real agents’ complex and heterogeneous cognitive 
processes which we mentioned before, are completely ignored by 
rational models. As we will see, this approach can capture only some 
aspects of the interaction between agents and economic reality. 
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2. Bounded rationality theory 
 
“ [ . . . ]  Undoubtedly there is  an area of human behavior  that  fi ts  
these assumptions (perfect  competi t ion and rat ional  agents)  to  a  
reasonable approximation,  where the classical  theory with i ts  
assumptions of rat ional i ty is  a  powerful  and useful  tool .  [ . . . ]  i t  fa i ls  to  
include some of the central  problems of confl ic t  and dynamics with 
which economics has become more and more concerned.  A metaphor  
wil l  help [ . . . ] .  
Suppose we were pouring some viscous l iquid -  molasses- into  a  
bowl of very i r regular  shape.  What  would we need in order  to  make a  
theory of the form the molasses would take in the bowl?  [ . . . ]  I f  the 
bowl were held  motionless ,  and if  we wanted only to  predict  behavior  
in equil ibr ium, we would have to  know l i t t le ,  indeed,  about  molasses.  
The single essential  assumption would be that  the molasses,  under the 
force of gravi ty,  would minimize the height  of i ts  center  of gravi ty.  
[ . . . ]  i f  we wanted to  know about  the behavior  before equi l ibr ium 
was reached,  [ . . . ]  or  i ts  behavior  in a  complex and rapidly changing 
environment,  i t  is  not  enough to  know i ts  goals.  We must  know also a  
great  deal  about  i ts  internal  structure and part icular ly i ts  mechanisms 
of adaptat ion.”  
Simon H.  (1959)  
 
In this quotation Simon points out an issue which is central for 
economic model building. The method that the rational theory suggests 
to represent the economic agents in models is powerful for 
representing some economic phenomena but is not suitable for 
representing phenomena where agents’ cognitive and adaptive 
processes have a central role. For this reason it is necessary to study in 
depth the nature of these processes and to represent them in models. In 
this work we will use the expression “bounded rationality theory” to 
refer to this position (we use the expression with a meaning wider than 
the original one, that of Simon’s theory). 
In this section we will first present some economic phenomena 
that the rationality theory cannot represent because they are strongly 
dependent on agents’ adaptive and cognitive processes. Second we will 
examine in depth the nature of these processes. 
Problem solving .  The perfect information hypothesis implies that 
agents’ cognitive processes can be reduced to decision making among 
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known options (decision making theory). This scheme is not suitable to 
represent activities like problem solving, learning and exploring. In 
fact these are essentially information searching activities. The research 
of Cyert, Simon and Trow (1956) showed that agents (in this case 
agents inside enterprises) have a decision making behavior only in the 
last stage of problem solving activity. 
Technological progress .  Technological progress is a fundamental 
element for market evolution and economic growth. Technological 
progress is an important example of economic phenomena which 
strongly involve agents’ information search. Moreover it involves 
information spreading mechanisms (Dosi et al.,  1988). Therefore it 
calls for models which go beyond rationality theory limits to be 
studied. 
Adjusting processes analysis .  Rationality theory is very suitable 
to study equilibrium and static issues. To study dynamic processes, 
models which contain adaptive mechanisms are more effective. 
Microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic disequilibrium .  
Incompatibility between macroeconomic disequilibrium theories (from 
Keynes onwards) and microeconomic “rational” principles, is well 
known. If we want to give plausible foundations to disequilibrium 
theories we have to make assumptions like imperfect information, 
agents learning, values of economic variables which change slowly, 
etc. 
Economic compound agents’ behavior .  The rationality theory has 
often attached small importance to “cognitive” and institutional 
phenomena of organizations : organizational structure, communication 
problems, organizational learning, etc. 
Now we discuss some examples of agents’ cognitive processes. 
The complexity of phenomena which you have to deal with as soon as 
you leave the maximizing-agent scheme will appear clearly. For the 
moment the bounded rationality theory has not succeeded in suggesting 
a scheme as general and simple as the one that rationality theory 
suggested. It  will be necessary to work in this direction to make the 
bounded rationality theory become competitive with the rationality 
theory in representing some economic phenomena. 
Goals minimal levels .  The agents do not try to maximize their 
goals but try to reach goals levels which they consider satisfying. This 
happens because of their action and cognitive limits (Simon, 1957). 
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Circular dependence of goals and performance, goals endogenity.  
Goals levels change depending on performance. Good performances 
make the agents’ levels increase, and vice versa for bad performances. 
The activity effort depends on the distance between the current 
situation and the goals (March, 1994). Moreover there are several 
economic, social and psychological elements which have a strong 
influence on the kind and level of agents’ goals. In some models (for 
instance: consumer models) they should be considered endogenous. 
Limited information, learning processes .  Agents have limited 
information and bounded cognitive abilities through which to reach 
their goals. Therefore they have to search for information and to 
acquire skills by learning from others or the experience. 
Attention, time and memory limits .  Attention has a limited 
“capacity”, therefore agents often disregard useful information. Time 
limits bring similar results. The stored information tends to be lost 
because of memory decay. 
Limits in converting information to knowledge.  Agents do not 
succeed in using all information at their disposal to build the best 
behaviors. In fact they have a limited ability to synthesize, induce, 
deduce, plan actions, etc. 
Heuristics .  Agents work out several tricks (short cuts) called 
heuristics to reach their goals in spite of their bounded cognitive 
abilities. A heuristic is a behavior that despite being based on cues 
instead of exhaustive analysis successfully identifies the more 
promising options (Newell and Simon, 1972). 
Implicit knowledge.  Agents’ knowledge has often an implicit 
format: it  is formed by automatic reactions, images, impressions, etc. 
In this cases it  can be communicated with difficulty and requires direct 
experience to be acquired. 
Routines .  A routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982) is an action 
scheme which allows one to carry out a particular task. The routine 
origin can be experience, imitation, problem solving, etc. A routine 
usually holds knowledge in an implicit format and is made up by an 
automatic behavior triggered by an environment input. Routines are 
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flexible action schemes which are adjusted to the specific situation 
through agent learning and problem solving ability (Egidi, 1992). 
“Intuitive” probability processing .  Agents often process 
probabilities in a way different from the one prescribed by the 
probability theory. A probability estimate is formed on the basis of 
past and remembered experiences. Therefore it strongly depends on 
their availability in memory, psychological importance, etc. (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973). Probability updating on the basis of new 
information often violates the Bayes theorem (underestimating of “base 
frequency” or new information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Communication problems.  In an organization made up of several 
people (compound agent) there are problems of transferring and 
sharing information. Natural language, written communications, 
computational data, have limits of expressiveness, speed, costs, noises, 
etc. (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Organization structure .  The behavior of an organization strongly 
depends on its internal structure (Marris, 1964). For example a 
decentralized organizational structure with subunits which have some 
decision autonomy, can be more efficient than a centralized one in a 
changing and dynamic environment. In fact it  can rapidly react to 
environmental changes (Marengo, 1992). 
 
3. Simulation models, neural networks and genetic algorithms 
 
The need to include agents’ cognitive processes in models raises 
the problem of how to represent them. 
We believe that artificial intelligence can suggest how to specify 
cognitive processes so that they can be represented in models (we will 
develop this fundamental issue later). 
At this point a new problem arises, the problem of how to express 
these processes through a suitable language, a suitable representation 
scheme. In recent years a new representation scheme has been 
developed. We are referring to computer simulation models. 
A simulation model allows the study of the evolution (in discrete 
time steps) of a simulated economic system in which there are one or 
more agents. This is done by inserting in the computer program the 
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initial conditions and the evolving rules of the system (agents’ 
adaptation and learning, environment reactions). 
Simulation models are very suitable for building models in which 
the researcher wants to represent agents and environment adaptive 
phenomena. The other models are less suitable. Verbal models and 
models based on graphics are not suitable to represent phenomena 
which have several quantitative aspects. Mathematical models 
represents dynamic and evolutionary phenomena through non linear 
differential equations which are very difficult to solve. Through 
computers memory and calculation power, simulation models allow the 
researcher to study dynamic phenomena by calculating their evolution 
step by step. 
Now we go back to the issue concerning the contribution which 
the artificial intelligence can make in specifying agents’ cognitive 
processes (Terna, 1992; Margarita, 1992; Fabbri and Orsini, 1993). 
Artificial intelligence has two research paradigms which are based 
on different principles: classic artificial intelligence and 
connectionism (Parisi, 1989). 
Classical artificial intelligence builds devices to reproduce 
superior human cognitive faculties which involve rationality, logic, 
coherence, a priori planning, symbolic and verbal expression. For this 
reason it states that the electronic computer is the best general model 
of an intelligent system. Expert systems are the most interesting 
devices which classical artificial intelligence has suggested. An expert 
system is a computer program able to give out diagnosis and problem 
solutions, similar to what a human expert in a field of knowledge 
(medicine, finance) can do. It is made of a “knowledge base” which is 
a large container of information, and an inferential engine which is a 
system that can make logic inferences on the information of the 
knowledge base. 
Connectionism has the goal to build devices which reproduce the 
real behaviors of animal and human cognitive systems (Pessa, 1993; 
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986). In particular its goal is to reproduce 
the flexibility, noise resistance, generalization ability and instance 
learning which natural systems have. For this reason it states that the 
brain is the best general model of an intelligent system. On the basis of 
this principle, connectionism has developed the “neural network”. It  is 
a device with a structure similar to the brain. 
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Besides neural networks, artificial intelligence has also developed 
other devices with flexibility, adaptability, noise resistance, etc. To 
give some examples we mention: genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975) 
which are a stylization of biological evolution mechanisms; classifier 
systems (Holland and Reitman, 1978) which are devices made by “if . . .  
then .. .  “ rules encoded by binary symbols in order to be processed by 
genetic algorithms; genetic programming (Koza, 1990) which applies 
genetic algorithms to populations of mathematical functions; 
algorithms which reproduce human learning processes (Arthur, 1991). 
These devices and the principles on which they are based are called 
“machine learning”. 
We believe that connectionist and machine learning devices are 
more suitable to represent agents’ cognitive processes than rigid 
symbolic devices of classic artificial intelligence. In fact these devices 
are based on an agent’s intelligence vision very close to the one of the 
bounded rationality theory. To show this fact, we now give a brief 
description of neural networks and genetic algorithms. It will also be 
useful in explaining how we implemented the artificial agents of the 
simulations. 
A neural network is a device with a structure similar to the brain 
(see Fig. 1 for an example). It  is made by a certain number of units 
which exchange signals through some connections. Each connection 
has a particular direction (from one particular unit to one particular 
unit) and also has a specific “weight” which amplifies or reduces the 
signal. In a neural network there are three kinds of units. The input 
units get signals directly from the environment (they are like physical 
sensors). The hidden units are not connected to the environment and 
process the information inside the network. The output units yield 
information going to the environment (actions, communications, etc.). 
In the simulations the network working occurs in discrete time steps. 
Within each time step every unit gets a particular activation, which 
usually is given by the weighted sum of the signals that the unit 
receives. Each unit gives out a signal which depends on the activation 
through a particular function (for instance a sigmoidal function). The 
next time step, this signal reaches the connected units and so on. 
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Fig. 1. A neural network with one input unit layer, one hidden unit 
layer and one output unit layer. 
 
The network answers to inputs coming from environment, 
depending on the network weights (if the network structure is given). 
The main issue that neural networks raise, is to find a mechanism 
(algorithm) to modify their weights (network learning) so that they 
express a behavior suitable to the task that they have to carry out.  
Research on neural networks has suggested different algorithms. 
Some of these are “supervised”. This means that someone has to supply 
the network with the output that is suitable to the particular received 
input. Other algorithms are “unsupervised”. This means that the 
network has to learn to carry out some tasks on the basis of only the 
input (for instance : to form input classes), or on the basis of global 
information like the whole behavior assessment. 
Genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 1989) are an 
example of this kind. They are very general algorithms which can be 
used to search for structures (made of building blocks) suitable to 
carry out better and better particular tasks. They are a stylization of 
natural selection (a “structure” corresponds to an organism). Now we 
point out the elements that a problem has to have to be solved with 
genetic algorithms. 
A population of structures that carry out a particular action in an 
environment .  A “structure” can be a living organism, the value of the 
independent variable of a mathematical function, the weights of a 
neural network, etc. This structure carries out a particular action in a 
certain environment. For instance, a living organism eats and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actions / Decisions 
Information 
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reproduces in the natural environment. An independent variable value 
makes the function assume a particular value. A neural network used to 
simulate an oligopolistic agent fixes the selling price (this is the case 
of our simulation). Genetic algorithms require a “population”, a 
number of structures, to work. 
Encoding of structures through a sequence of symbols .  Genetic 
algorithms require each structure of the population to be encoded 
through a particular sequence of symbols. For instance living 
organisms are “encoded” through nucleic bases of DNA, a variable 
value can be encoded through a binary string, a network through the 
sequence of its weights. 
Fitness .  Genetic algorithms require each structure to be tested in 
the environment and its performance to be assessed with one only 
value (fitness). For example an organism has to be assessed on the 
basis of its adaptation to the environment, an independent variable 
value on the basis of the value that its function gives out, the network 
of our simulations on the basis of the yielded profit.  
We now examine the dynamic working of the genetic algorithms. 
Environment test for the fitness assessment .  First we generate a 
population of structures by generating at random the strings that codify 
them. Then we test each structure in the environment to assess its 
fitness. 
Reproduction, crossing-over and mutation .  We replace the 
existing population with structures which come from the old structures 
with the highest fitness: the higher an organism’s fitness is, the greater 
is its likelihood of reproducing. The new population structures are 
generated from the old population ones through the manipulation of 
these made by crossing-over and mutation. Crossing-over implies that 
the new structure codifying-string is built by mixing the codifying 
strings of two “parents’” structures. Mutation implies that the string 
built in this way is slightly modify by changing some of its symbols at 
random. 
After the reproduction, the new structures are tested in the 
environment in order to assess their fitness. The whole cycle repeats 
several times (generations). This process yields populations of 
structures more and more adapted to the “environment” (organisms that 
reproduce more, independent variable values that have the tendency to 
maximize the function, neural networks that yields higher profits). 
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These brief hints are only a minimal part of the ideas that 
connectionism and machine learning are suggesting. Connectionist and 
machine learning devices are based on principles which are strongly 
similar to the vision of economic agents of the bounded rationality 
theory; therefore they allow one to suitably represent agents’ cognitive 
processes into economic models. Now we highlight this similarity of 
principles by showing that these devices allow one to suitably 
represent the cognitive processes we spoke about before. 
Minimal levels of goals, circular dependence of goals and 
performance .  For the thesis we run some simulations in which agents 
had to achieve several goals at the same time. To this end, we used the 
suggestions of the article of Simon (1974). In this work agents fix their 
goals by choosing minimal levels to achieve. Moreover without 
maximizing or using concepts like marginal utility, they choose the 
goal to pursue each time by using very simple and plausible 
mechanisms (they have a connectionist and adaptive nature). These 
mechanisms are based on the comparison between achieved and 
pursued goals levels. On this basis, it  has been easy to make 
simulations in which the minimal levels are influenced by the agent’s 
own performance or by the other agents’ performance. 
Limited information, learning processes .  One of the main reasons 
for which neural networks and machine learning devices have been 
developed is that they have more flexibility, adaptability and 
experience-learning ability than the symbolic systems, like expert 
systems. 
Attention, time and memory limits .  Neural networks are often used 
to simulate human attention and memory processes. This is possible 
because they are similar to the neural structures which support human 
cognitive processes (Pessa, 1993). Moreover neural networks allow us 
to represent agents’ limited available time by decreasing the number of 
learning cycles. 
Limits in converting information to knowledge.  Usually neural 
networks are trained through examples. They have the ability to 
generalize and extract rules from them. In doing this they are limited 
by their structure and working mechanisms. By suitably modifying 
these two elements it is easy to adjust their abilities to convert 
information to knowledge. 
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Heuristics .  In our simulations there are agents implemented by 
neural networks who have bounded cognitive abilities. We will show 
that they develop decision rules that do not use all available 
information but still  succeed in achieving satisfying results. 
Routines .  When neural networks or machine learning devices have 
finished the training stage, they express a behavior that strongly 
depends on the examples by which they have been trained. For instance 
neural networks can generalize (to deal with cases similar to known 
cases) by modifying their answer on the basis of the similarity between 
new and old stimuli. 
Implicit knowledge.  The neural networks’ knowledge and 
answering ability is stored in their weights in a distributed way. This 
means that each weight does not have any role if it  is considered alone. 
Together with other weights it  takes part in answering to many 
different environmental stimuli. Therefore typically a neural network 
stores knowledge in a implicit way. Similar considerations can be made 
for many machine learning devices. 
 
4. Oligopoly models 
 
In the thesis we presented a general survey about oligopolistic 
models which research has produced. For the sake of brevity and 
because this part is about well known models, in this work we will 
give just a brief summary. We want to achieve two goals. The first goal 
is to review the theoretical background of our simulations. The second 
goal is to compare simulation models and standard models. 
A first oligopolistic model class consists of the models which 
belong to classic market models like perfect competition and pure 
monopoly. They are based on perfect information and profit 
maximization assumptions. We only mention two models chosen from a 
huge literature. The goal is to point out the main features of these kind 
of models. 
The first example is the model of Gaskins (1971). The industry 
structure of the model of Gaskins consists of one large leader 
enterprise and some smaller enterprises. The leader enterprise can 
directly set the price. This power comes from its technological 
superiority and low costs. In this way the leader enterprise can control 
profits gained by small enterprises, therefore it can control their 
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entering end exiting the market. The leader enterprise tries to 
maximize the sum of future profits which are discounted through a 
discount rate r. A high r means that future profits are considered less 
important than current ones by the leader. Vice versa if r is low. 
Some following models have abandoned some constraining 
assumptions of the model of Gaskins. For example Judd and Petersen 
(1986) have built a model in which small enterprises also have a 
maximizing behavior. In fact, despite not having the power to 
influence the price, they can fix the amount of profit to reinvest and 
therefore the growth rate of the whole body of small enterprises. 
However the model results are similar to the ones of the model of 
Gaskins. 
A second model class consists of games theory models (Rasmusen, 
1989). Games theory is the framework which rationality theory often 
uses to build oligopolistic models. The reason is that games theory is 
based on agents’ perfect rationality, proposes strategic interaction 
patterns, aims at determining systems equilibria. 
The first group of these models (like Cournot and Stackelberg 
models) consists of games where some agents fix the produced and 
sold quantity of a homogeneous product to maximize the profits. 
Available information consists of the demand and costs functions 
(these can have different shapes according to the model hypothesis). 
To make a decision the agents have to “conjecture” the adversaries’ 
reaction which will follow their own action, and have to incorporate 
this conjecture into their decisions. In the models this reasoning is 
represented through constrained mathematical maximization according 
to the pattern that we showed in the first paragraph. 
A variation of these models are the models of Bertrand. They are 
based on agents’ perfect information and suitable cognitive abilities. 
They are different from the models we have just seen because the 
decision variable is the price instead of the quantity. The most simple 
Bertrand game shows an interesting paradox. If we assume agents’ 
perfect information and cognitive abilities, friction absence, etc.,  the 
market price gets the level of the average cost. This happens because 
of the agents’ competition to gain the whole market (it  is a conjectured 
competition, not a real one). The paradox is that by passing from pure 
monopoly to a competitive situation (even with two agents only) the 
price falls to the level of the average cost and the profits go to zero as 
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it happens in perfect competition. To build a more realistic model it is 
necessary to make assumptions like the slowness of consumers’ 
reaction to prices (like in our models), products differentiation, 
enterprises geographic localization, etc. In this way a wide class of 
models have been built,  which are more plausible than the original one. 
Recent games theory models abandon the assumption of perfect 
information. They represent agents with learning abilities (action 
learning) and introduce environmental noise (stochastic models). 
These models still  belong to the rationality theory framework. The 
agent’s action is the result of profit maximization. The learning 
processes usually have a typical rational nature. They are Bayesian 
probability updating or statistical regressions. (See Kirman (1995) for 
a survey and Alepuz and Urbano (1991) for an example). 
With the introduction of learning processes into the model, the 
rational theory implicitly recognizes the importance of making less 
constrained assumptions like the imperfect information assumption. 
Moreover it  recognizes the importance of studying the relation between 
the evolution of economic systems and agents’ adaptive processes. 
This research line has serious difficulties. 
The first problem is the descriptive and predictive potential of 
these models. Much empirical research (the research of the 
psychologists Tverky and Kahneman is famous in this field) has 
reached well-established results. They show that Bayes theorem gives 
bad descriptions and predictions of agents’ behavior. Also statistical 
regressions are not plausible as learning processes representations. In 
fact they assume that the agents know the shape of mathematical 
functions. 
The second problem is the high formal complexity of the models 
despite the many simplifying assumptions which these models make: 
 
 “Even in a  relat ively s imple repeated game of the type I  consider  
here,  i f  the individuals  maximize inter temporal ly,  learning about  the 
model  is  very complicated.  This is  easi ly seen i f  one considers the 
problem of the monopolist  faced with an unknown,  but  l inear ,  demand 
curve.  Here the problem of s trategic interact ion is  absent  but  the 
problem of how to  optimally set  pr ices to  maximize the discounted sum 
of profi ts  is  s t i l l  not  completely solved.  This  is  essential ly because 
there is  a t  each moment a  t rade-off between information gained and 
short-run profi t  lost .  Trying to  incorporate this  problem of “act ive 
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learning” into  a  model  in which there is  also  s trategic interact ion is ,  
for  the moment,  unmanageable.”  
Kirman A.  (1995) .  
 
This complexity makes this model inflexible and reduces its 
heuristic effectiveness and diffusion among researchers. 
Now we examine the work of Sylos Labini “Oligopolio e 
progresso tecnico” (Sylos Labini, 1957). 
This work is very relevant for our research because it has some 
features which bring it toward the bounded rationality theory. 
It  tries to point out the fundamental traits of the oligopolistic 
market, and to describe the market dynamic evolution. These 
fundamental traits are found through empirical analysis and the picture 
which emerges is often different from the one of the rational theory. 
Now we analyze these fundamental traits. 
The productivity of factors is assumed to be constant, therefore 
average costs are decreasing (fixed cost is divided by the whole 
production). Enterprises try to keep the production at a level similar to 
the long run average level. This level is not far from the production 
plant maximum level. 
Another fundamental feature of the model is technology. The 
technology which enterprises use is discontinuous. Different dimension 
enterprises have different levels of technology. The large dimension 
enterprises usually have a level of technology higher than the small 
ones. This means that large enterprises have a higher capital intensity 
(therefore higher fixed costs and lower variable costs) and lower 
average costs. This makes the large enterprises price leaders and the 
small enterprises price takers. 
Enterprises make their decisions on the basis of a price which 
they fix through the full cost principle, by adding a certain margin 
called mark-up to the unitary variable cost. Mark-up has to cover fixed 
costs and has to yield a profit which is considered minimum (therefore 
the profit is structural in the market). 
Each enterprise has two critical price levels. The first is the 
elimination price, which is equal to the enterprise average cost. If the 
market price goes under the elimination price, the enterprise exits the 
market. The second is the exclusion price, which corresponds to the 
minimum profit level. The market price has to be over this price to 
make the enterprise stay on the market in the long run. 
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The last fundamental trait of the model is the “industry structure”. 
It  consists of an enterprise number for each different dimension (three 
in the model: small, medium and large). 
Sylos Labini shows the working of his model by assuming a 
particular initial industry structure and market price. Then he analyses 
their possible dynamic evolution. This evolution depends on the 
advantage for small and medium enterprises to enter or exit the market. 
Also it depends on large enterprise’s opportunity to raise the price in 
order to increase profits, or to reduce the price in order to make small 
or middle enterprises exit the market. 
Now we examine the features of the Sylos Labini model which are 
interesting for our research. 
The model is a dynamic and long-term one. It  shows the adaptive 
processes of enterprises and industry, triggered by some environmental 
changes like demand growth, cost decreases due to technological 
progress, etc. 
Another interesting feature of the model is the attempt to indicate 
the elements on which the enterprises focus their attention. This is 
important because real agents show the tendency to reduce their 
cognitive effort by singling out important pieces of information among 
the available ones (Rumiati, 1990). 
Another interesting feature of the model concerns the agents’ 
goals. They are not quantities to maximize, but satisfying levels to 
achieve. For instance the minimum profit that enterprises use to fix the 
mark-up margin, has a typically satisfying nature. 
The most interesting feature of the model is the mark-up rule. 
This rule is very simple to apply. Moreover it is robust. This means 
that it produces positive results in different environmental conditions. 
Therefore it is a behavior rule suitable for agents with bounded 
cognitive abilities. 
 
5. Simulation structure and artificial agents 
 
In this section first we will show the working of our oligopolistic 
market simulation model and explain the implementation of the 
artificial agents we used. 
At the beginning of the simulation, agents (with the same 
production and technological features) have equal market shares. In 
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each interaction, agents fix their selling price Pi (the good produced is 
homogeneous) on the basis of the information coming from the 
environment (see Fig. 2). The market price P is the average of agents’ 
prices weighted by old agents’ market shares St-1
i  :  
 
(1)                          ( ) P =    P    S    i t-1i
i
×∑  
 
The consumers express a particular demand level Q on the basis 
of market price. The demand function is linear and decreasing. 
The market share S t
i  of each agent increases or decreases if the 
agent price is higher or lower than the market price : 
 
(2)                    S =  C  S t
i
t - 1
i×                  C =  
P
Pi
v


  
 
The parameter v represents the “market speed”. It measures the 
speed with which the consumers have information about prices and 
pass to sellers with low prices. 
The sold quantity Qi and the gained profit Π i  of each agent are : 
 
(3)        Q =  Q  Si t
i×             ( ) ( ) =   P   Q  -  CVU  Q  -  CFi i i iΠ × ×  
 
where CVU are the unit variable costs and CF are the fixed costs. 
This model is similar to the Bertrand game. The difference is that 
the demand adjustment is slow across time. 
Now we make an observation about the economic environment 
that we have just described. It is very important to implement artificial 
agents. 
The slow demand adjustment implies that a pure adaptive agent 
(an agent who learns only on the basis of trial and error) loses his 
market share quickly. In fact he tends to fix high prices to gain short-
term profits (the effect of the market share loss will happen later). 
Therefore in these cases a learning process is necessary based on 
conjectures. This is a process which assesses an action on the basis of 
the effects that it  yields in the middle-term. To implement this kind of 
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learning process, the agent has to have an internal representation of the 
environment. In this way he can test a priori  the conjectures about the 
behavior to hold through the internal representation, and he can use the 
behaviors which have a high probability of success in the real world. 
Another solution can be a trial and error learning process which tests 
each “trial” in the real world, across many interactions. But this would 
require too much time and therefore is not plausible. 
Now we explain the artificial agents’ functioning and structure.  
Each agent consists of a certain number of neural networks (for 
instance 30) which have the structure shown in Fig. 2. Each of these 
networks can fix the selling price by having at their disposal the 
following information : fixed costs and unitary variable costs at 
present time; unitary variable costs, adversaries’ prices, market price, 
market quantity, agent’s own price and agent’s own market share over 
past time; agent’s own market share variation and profit share variation 
across the two past times. 
 
 
Fig. 2. One of the networks of the agent’s network repertoire. 
 
During an interaction each agent uses the network which is the 
best at that moment (it has the highest fitness, as we will see later). 
The network answer depends on its weights. The change of 
weights in order to achieve useful answers (the network learning) is 
made through a genetic algorithm. The “DNA” of each network is 
represented by the sequence of the network weights. The genetic 
operators (reproduction, crossing over, mutation) are applied to this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
    CF         CV-1        P2-1        QM-1         S-1        dPro 
           CV           P1-1       PM-1         P-1         dS-1 
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sequence. The networks’ reproduction is made every certain number of 
periods (for instance 3 or 10). This reproduction is made on the basis 
of the networks’ fitness. Now we explain how this fitness is assessed. 
During an interaction each agent can fix only one price. Therefore 
he can assess the fitness of only one network. The fitness is assessed 
on the basis of the agent’s goal, for example on the basis of the profit 
that the price has yielded. How is it  possible to assess the whole 
network repertoire, in order to obtain the fitness of each network at the 
end of the cycle ?  A solution is to assess the unused networks on the 
basis of the agent’s internal model. The best way to provide the agent 
with an internal model is to give him some other neural networks 
which learn to foresee environmental and adversaries’ reactions 
through experience. For simplicity we did not follow this route and we 
decided to give a connectionist and adaptive nature only to the action-
building part of the cognitive system of agents. 
Therefore the predictive part of the cognitive system of each agent 
did not have a connectionist and adaptive nature. The solution we 
adopted was this. We supplied the agents with environmental 
information which was dynamic, uncertain and experience-dependent. 
In this way we “simulated” the kind of information that the agent 
would have had at his disposal if he had had an adaptive and 
connectionist internal model. We implemented the solution in this way. 
The agent fixes a price through the neural network which has the 
highest fitness at that moment. Then he has to assess each other 
conjecture of his repertoire. If the particular neural network to assess 
had fixed a price higher than the actual used price, then the 
corresponding market price would have been higher and the market 
demand would have been lower. By estimating this hypothetical 
demand level the agent makes a mistake. The larger the difference 
between actual and hypothetical price, the larger the range of the 
mistake. In the simulations the average mistake size (which linearly 
depends on the difference we said) can be tuned. The mistake level 
gives rise to a particular level of what we call “cognitive noise”. The 
demand estimation range (which depends on the particular cognitive 
noise level) is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. Range of the agent’s market demand estimate. 
 
Note: 
The range of the agent’s market demand estimate (QMmin-QMmax) 
depends on the hypothetical (PMIp) and the effective (PMEf) market 
price. The dotted lines have a distance from the demand curve which 
depends on the cognitive noise. The researcher fixes the cognitive 
noise level by deciding the ratio: 
(QMmax-QMIp)/(QMEf-QMIp). 
 
In the same way we have simulated the mistake that the agent 
makes when he estimates the effects that the hypothetical price would 
have yielded on his market share. The larger the difference between 
hypothetical and actual price, the larger the estimation mistake. This is 
a second source of cognitive noise. We introduced a third source of 
cognitive noise by adding noise to the final profit estimation. This 
final estimation represents the fitness of the assessed conjecture. 
We observe that the average of the agent’s stochastic estimations, 
is equal to the values that there would have been if the hypothetical 
price had actually been used. This is not a limit of the model. In fact it  
is possible to introduce a bias (an error in the averages) in the agent’s 
estimations. For instance we can consider a risk-adverse agent who 
estimates the effect that a hypothetical price higher than the real price, 
can have on his market share. In this case we could build a model in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       PM 
PMIp 
PMEf 
       QM     QM mi n      QM max  
             QM Ip       QM Ef  
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which this estimation has a bias consisting of a systematic 
overestimation of that effect. 
We actually introduced a bias like this in our simulations. In fact 
despite the conjectural learning, agents were not able to learn to reduce 
the price if their market share decreased toward dangerous levels. To 
avoid this fact (clearly it was due to an inadequate learning process) 
we used a market speed higher than the real one for the agent 
estimations (this leads to more cautious and market share caring 
estimations: see formula 2). 
 
6. Oligopolistic market simulations 
 
In this section we will examine two groups of oligopolistic market 
simulations. We aim to show through some actual examples that the 
kind of models we propose in this work can be used to study economic 
phenomena which could be studied with difficulty through traditional 
models. 
The first group of simulations show that if the environment is 
complex, agents focus their attention on particular pieces of 
information and disregard the remaining ones. This happens because 
they are endowed with limited cognitive resources. To verify this 
hypothesis we analyzed the price-setting procedures which emerged in 
two different simulations. The first simulation has an environment 
which is more complex than the one of the second simulation : three 
agents (two in the second) and a randomly changeable market demand 
(stable in the second). 
Specifically the first simulation has the following features: 
interactions 5000, agents 3, demand intercept 1000, demand slope 
coefficient -1, fixed costs 10000, unitary variable costs 300, neural 
networks for each agent 31, hidden units for each network 3, demand 
change 20% (the demand intercept changes randomly, with a maximum 
of 20%, with a uniform probability distribution), direct costs change 
30% (they change randomly, too) actual market speed 0.5, market 
speed that the agents use in their estimations 5.0, interactions number 
to regenerate the neural networks through genetic algorithms 15, 
market demand cognitive noise 0.1, market share cognitive noise 0.1, 
profit cognitive noise 0.1. 
  24
Fig. 4 (prices fixed by agents) shows that the three agents develop 
a mark-up setting price procedure. In the figure the unitary variable 
costs CV are shown. The unitary average costs, not in the figure, are 
slightly higher. 
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Fig. 4. In a complex environment agents develop a mark-up setting 
price procedure: they add a constant margin to the variable cost CV. 
 
The weight matrices of the neural networks which are behind such 
behaviors (Fig. 5), confirm that the agents actually focus their 
attention on the costs and disregard other remaining information, 
namely information about adversaries’ actions. 
Now we explain how to interpret these matrices. The three 
matrices hold the weights of the best networks at the end of the 
simulation, of each one of the three agents. In each matrix, the 
different lines contain the weights of the hidden unit connections. The 
columns (except the last one) contain the weights which correspond to 
the different input units which get information from the environment. 
The last column contains the weights of the only neural network output 
unit. It  corresponds to the price decision variable. The bold typed 
weights are the weights which play an actual role. They are higher then 
a particular quantity (150, empirically found) and they correspond to 
lines which have a weight in the last column (otherwise they would 
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correspond to weights which are not connected to output units. See 
Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Weight matrices of the neural networks (one for each agent) 
which have the highest fitness at the end of the simulation. 
 
Legend: 
CF current fixed costs 
CV current unitary variable costs 
CV-1 past unitary variable costs 
P1-1 and P2-1 past adversaries’ prices 
PM-1 past market price 
QM-1 past market quantity 
P-1 past agent’s price 
S-1 past agent’s market share 
dS agent’s market share variation across the two past times 
dPro profit share variation across the two past times 
P current agent’s price 
 
We repeated the simulation with different random seeds of the 
computer program (they involve different initial conditions and random 
events). Each time we obtained results similar to these ones. 
Agent  
1  
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
P2 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1°hid.   109  204 99 77  364 
2°hid.   732 140   391
3°hid 155   78   
Agent  
2  
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
P2 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1°hid.   205  530 139   
2°hid.   612  108 68   
3°hid   853  41 22   69
Agent 
3  
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
P2 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1°hid.     151 213 11  
2°hid.   999  25 138   32
3°hid  113  135 7 164 14 
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The second simulation has a more simple environment than the 
first one. There are only two agents in it (duopoly) and the market 
demand is stable. Also in this situation, the agents’ behavior is 
essentially based on the mark-up setting price procedure as you can see 
in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. In a simple environment agents develop a setting-price 
procedure based on mark-up but also reactive to adversaries’ actions. 
 
The interesting fact is that the agents use the mark-up procedure 
as the basis of action. In fact they build on it a behavior which is 
articulated and reactive to adversaries’ actions. Fig. 6 shows this 
behavior. In the 1201 interaction the two agents have equal market 
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shares. Both agents set a price on the basis of mark-up, as you can see 
in the first graph: during interactions 1201-1225 there is an almost 
constant margin between the prices and the CV. However agent 2 loses 
market share since agent 1 sets a price slightly lower than his in 
several interactions. For this reason agent 2 gets out from the mark-up 
scheme and sets a price definitely lower than agent 1 during 
interactions 1227-1230. This fact triggers a reaction of agent 1 during 
interactions 1231-1232. He lowers his price even less than CV, thus 
stopping his market share loss. This action-reaction sequence recurs 
again during interactions 1234-1238. Afterwards the two agents again 
set the price on the basis of mark-up, and agent 1 rebuilds his market 
share by setting a price slightly lower than the adversary one. 
The existence of the reactive behavior (based on mark-up) is 
confirmed by the neural networks weights matrices which emerged 
during the simulation. First, weights emerge which correspond to CV. 
Afterwards these weights remain, but other weights emerge which 
correspond to the other information. So the agents’ behavior become 
more articulated. We show these facts by reporting in Fig. 7 the weight 
“pictures” taken during the simulation. 
 
 
 
Inte .  
2000 
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro 
 
P  
1° Ag.      
1°hid .  -217 206 487 -130 -354 -273 183 
2°hid.  68 101  -188 -384 2 -8 -36 260 
3°hid 134 695 -247 -670 -513 -124 348
2° Ag.      
1°hid .  -176 222 -315 -139 300 49 113 -67 -597 
2°hid.   912 16 -30 -122 -613 -219 6 120 27
3°hid 321 -149 -151 64 -4 -571 157 449 -140 
Inte .  
3000 
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1° Ag.      
1°hid .  -2  -21  180 95 -31 96  
2°hid.  -185 -134 249 -71 -105 -178 52 -22 240 
3°hid  925 -69 -62 -668 -522 69  122
2° Ag.      
1°hid .  -11 -130 -81 141 19 -25 -360 -6 -274 -108 
2°hid.  -125 635 -191 -135 -431 -449 -122 49 -93 138
3°hid 549 500 -342 313 -168 
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Fig. 7. Neural network weights during the simulation. 
 
These matrices show that the mark-up rule is developed early and 
then used as a basis to build behaviors which take into account the 
information about an adversary’s action. Agent 1 develops early a 
reactive setting-price procedure which agent 2 discovers during the last 
interactions, after a long time of search. The effectiveness of this 
reactive procedure is proven by the cumulated profits which are shown 
in Fig. 8. 
 
Interaction Cumulated profits  
of  1° agent  
Cumulated profits  
of  2° agent  
2000   57.241.953   53.961.466 
3000   86.637.943   81.922.696 
4000 116.204.807 110.044.921 
5000 148.650.383 147.079.437 
 
Fig. 8. Agent 1 gets higher profits then agent 2 until interaction 4000, 
when agent 2 also finds the reactive procedure. 
 
Inte .  
4000 
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1° Ag.      
1°hid .  173 -121 -7  16 -183 186 -266 
2°hid.  -20  219 164 -11 71 -102 198 -319 
3°hid -56 670 -75 -285 -552 -156 -309 250
2° Ag.      
1°hid .  23 348 290 345 57 -47 184 175  
2°hid.   947  -321 -637 -298 37 227
3°hid 222 426  20 -337 -104  
Inte .  
5000 
CF CV CV 
-1 
P1 
-1  
PM 
-1 
QM 
-1 
P  
-1  
S 
-1  
dS dPro P 
1° Ag.      
1°hid .  202 44 -77 -289 79 -187 -89 
2°hid.  -469  530 118 26 -121 66 217 -315 
3°hid 264 385  -480 -624 -151 -170 344
2° Ag.      
1°hid .  16 -18 -196 69 -69 -377 -143  
2°hid.   519  25 -666 -757 48  478
3°hid  -101  -33  
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We can interpret this price-setting procedure because the evolved 
neural networks are very simple. This is risky as every neural network 
behavior interpretation based on the analysis of its weights. 
The weight which corresponds to the price (italic type) is positive. 
This fact implies that the sign of the weights which correspond to the 
different information variables, is also the sign of the relations 
between such variables and the decision variable (see Fig. 2). The 
mark-up rule is due to the positive sign which corresponds to the CV. 
The reactive behavior is due to the weights which correspond to the 
market quantity and to the old agent’s own price (both negative). The 
weight corresponding to the market quantity actually causes the 
reactive behavior. The weight corresponding to the old agent’s own 
price is a limit to the reactive behavior. If agent 1 (for instance) “sees” 
that the market quantity suddenly increases, he can infer that agent 2 
has lowered his price. This calls for agent 1 to lower his price to avoid 
a market share loss. This adversary pursuit has to have a limit, 
otherwise it could create a monetary loss (price under costs). The 
whole price-setting procedure is outlined in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Outline of the setting-price procedure which the two agents 
have developed. 
 
These simulations confirm that an agent focuses his attention on 
important parts of information and develops simple and robust 
behaviors if his cognitive abilities are overwhelmed by environment 
complexity. If the environment is more simple he is able to use more 
information, like the one about adversaries. 
This first group of simulations confirms the results of Dosi et al. 
(1994) and Valente (1992), from whom we started our search. Our 
simulated “economic environment” is similar to the one which they 
used. The difference is that they used genetic programming while we 
used neural networks. Also in this research the agents develop the 
mark-up as setting-price procedure in different environmental 
 
>CV   =>  >P     Mark-up 
>QM  =>  (<P2-1 =>) <P  Reactive behavior 
<P-1  =>  >P     Limitation of reactive behavior 
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conditions. This confirms that the mark-up rule is robust and allows 
the agents to reduce the amount of information to process. 
Now we show the results of a second group of simulations. The 
goal of these simulations is to show that the nature of agents’ cognitive 
processes and their functioning can have an effect on the evolution of 
the economic systems. Specifically we show how market-price depends 
on the market speed and on the farsightedness of the agents. We 
remember that the market speed represents the speed with which the 
consumers have information about prices and move the demand toward 
sellers with low prices. The agents’ farsightedness is given by the 
number of interactions which have to pass before the agents’ neural 
network repertoire is replaced with new neural networks by the genetic 
algorithm. The larger this number, the longer the time prospect of the 
developed neural networks. 
To display this relation, we show four simulations in which 
different levels of market speed and agents’ farsightedness yield 
different effects on market price. The obtained results are presented in 
Fig. 10. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Effects that farsightedness and the market speed yield on 
market price. 
 
In the case of high farsightedness and high market speed we 
lowered the market speed to 1.0/0.1 (the real speed and the speed that 
the agents use to make their estimates). We lowered the speed because 
the farsightedness makes the agents slow to react in time when their 
market shares get rapidly lower (rapidity is due to high market speed). 
In this way the system easily goes toward monopoly. This is an 
interesting phenomenon per se,  but it went far from the pursued goals. 
  Farsightedness 
  High: 15 Low: 2 
 
 
Market 
High: 
5.0/0.5 
Simulation 1: 
Low P ≅  380 
(speed 1.0/0.1) 
Simulation 2: 
middle P ≅  400 
speed 
 
 
Low: 
1.0/0.005 
Simulation 3: 
middle P ≅  400 
Simulation 4: 
High P ≅  620 
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The other important parameter values were : demand change 0.2, 
costs change 0.3, cognitive noise 0.1, 0.1, 0.1. Now we show the 
simulations results with the graphs of Fig. 11, 12, 13, 14. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
49
51
49
53
49
55
49
57
49
59
49
61
49
63
49
65
49
67
49
69
49
71
49
73
49
75
49
77
49
79
49
81
49
83
49
85
49
87
49
89
49
91
49
93
49
95
49
97
49
99
CV M ark et P M onopoly  O ptim um  P
 
 
Fig. 11. Simulation 1: high speed, high farsightedness. 
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Fig. 12. Simulation 2: high speed, low farsightedness. 
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Fig. 13. Simulation 3: low speed, high farsightedness. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
49
51
49
53
49
55
49
57
49
59
49
61
49
63
49
65
49
67
49
69
49
71
49
73
49
75
49
77
49
79
49
81
49
83
49
85
49
87
49
89
49
91
49
93
49
95
49
97
49
99
CV M ark et P M onopoly  O ptim um  P
 
 
Fig. 14. Simulation 4: low speed, low farsightedness. 
 
These results have been confirmed by other simulations with the 
same parameters and different random seeds, and by other simulations 
with different parameter combinations. 
An interpretation of these results is the following. 
Relation between market speed and market price. 
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In a situation with a high market speed, if an agent lowers his 
price he rapidly enlarges his market share. This fact triggers the 
adversaries’ reaction. In fact they lower their price to avoid being 
expelled from the market. Moreover no agent raises his price over the 
market price to increase his profits. If he did he would have a rapid 
market share loss. The global effect is that the price has a downtrend. 
Relation between farsightedness and market price. 
High farsightedness means that agents assess their 
network/procedures by considering many interactions. The effect is 
that agents ascribe a high weight to the effects that a particular short 
run price yields on their market share (and middle-term profits). Again 
the global effect is that the price has a downtrend. 
We made a simulation that confirmed the relation between 
farsightedness and market price. In this simulation there was an agent 
with the farsightedness parameter equal to 3, and two agents with 
farsightedness parameters equal to 10. The result of this simulation is 
shown in Fig. 15. Agent 3 (high farsightedness) succeeds in gaining a 
large market share by setting a price not much higher than variable 
costs. He even sets a price under variable costs when they have a peak. 
The other agents use a setting-price rule based on mark-up. They get a 
constant profit flow but also a small market share. 
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Fig. 15. Prices and market shares of three agents with different levels 
of farsightedness. 
 
We think that these simulations show clearly that the agents’ 
cognitive processes can have a decisive effect on the studied economic 
system. In this case models cannot ignore them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The rationality theory tries to predict the economic agents’ 
behavior (or the evolution of multiple-agent systems) by using only 
agents’ goals and information about the environment. Cognitive 
processes do not play any role in this type of model. 
This theory cannot study and predict economic phenomena like 
technological production and diffusion and macroeconomic 
disequilibrium. The bounded rationality theory overcomes these limits. 
It  acknowledges the importance of real agents’ cognitive processes to 
study economic phenomena. 
The artificial intelligence research approaches called 
connectionism and machine learning, try to build intelligent devices 
(neural networks, genetic algorithms, etc.) by following an intelligence 
vision very similar to the bounded rationality theory (adaptation, 
learning, implicit information, etc.). For this reason we claim that 
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these intelligent devices allow the researcher to represent the economic 
agents’ cognitive processes in computer simulated models. 
To add empirically support to this thesis, we have built an actual 
simulation model. In particular we have simulated the oligopolistic 
markets. The simulations show the flexibility and feasibility of 
simulation models which use connectionist and machine learning 
methods. Moreover they show that these methods are useful for 
studying phenomena which can be studied with difficulty through 
rational models. 
The particular simulation results show that economic agents try to 
lower the cognitive effort by using simple and robust action procedures 
like the mark-up rule. Other results show that the nature and 
functioning of cognitive processes can yield important effects on the 
evolution of economic systems. 
We believe that further research of the kind of present model, 
should follow four different lines. 
The first research line concerns the methodology of economics. It 
should clearly point out the strengths and the applicability limits of the 
rationality theory. Economists too often take some principles for 
granted which should be used with much awareness. 
The second research line should study in depth the agents’ 
behavior when they make decisions, solve problems, etc., in particular 
when they act within an organization. This microeconomic and 
psychological research should be carried out also with experiments on 
real agents to gain reliability. 
The third research line should study in depth the simulation tools 
and the intelligent devices developed by artificial intelligence, and it 
can even build new tools and refine the existing ones to satisfy the 
particular needs of economic theory. 
The fourth research line should build other simulation models 
similar to the present model. It  will be possible to give a final 
judgment on the simulation models’ utility for economic theory, only 
by accumulating other experiences and results. 
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